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Abstract
How can you determine if financial legislation is effective?
This article seeks to identify three characteristics that make
up the basis for an effectiveness review, being the determi-
nation what the legislative objective is, who is it aimed at
and what approach is taken to achieve this objective. Deter-
mining the legislative objective may prove to be a challeng-
ing undertaking, and the uncertainties that come with that
affect the other two characteristics as well. And even if a
clear legislative objective can be established, how can you
be sure that its achievement was in fact attributable to the
legislation under review? What do you compare your results
to absent a baseline measurement and how can the vast
number of variables that affect the effectiveness of the leg-
islation under review be accounted for, if at all? Is effective-
ness in financial legislation at all measurable and, when
measured, what is its value in practice?
Keywords: effectiveness, effectiveness measurement meth-
odologies, financial legislation, legislative objective, product
approval governance
1 Introduction
Generally, the intention of legislation will be to address,
steer or deter certain behaviour either exhibited or
expected by individuals, entities or both, and depending
on the legislative approach chosen, some form of coer-
cion or incentivisation will be used to ensure compliance
in order to reach the intended goal.1 Financial legisla-
tion, as any other legislation, can be considered effective
when it successfully produces the intended results,
those results usually being the degree to which the
intended goal of the policymakers is actually achieved.2
The measure of effectiveness is thus the result of the
* Jeroen Koomans is affiliated to the University of Amsterdam FEB Acade-
my for Banking and Insurance and employed by ABN AMRO Bank N.V.
The views, thoughts and opinions expressed in the text belong solely to
the author, and not necessarily to the author’s employer.
1. M. Weber (edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich), Economy and Society:
An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (2013), at 34-5; see also
C. Coglianese, ‘Measuring Regulatory Performance; Evaluating the
Impact of Regulation and Regulatory Policy’, OECD Expert Paper
August 2012:1, at 8.
2. C.K. Haarhuis and B. Niemeijer, ‘Wetten in werking; Over interventies,
werking, effectiviteit en context’, 2 Recht der Werkelijkheid 9-34, at
10-11 (2008); M. Mousmouti, ‘Operationalising Quality of Legislation
through the Effectiveness Test’, 6(2) Legisprudence 191-206, at 201
(2012); H. Xanthaki, ‘An Enlightened Approach to Legislative Scrutiny:
sum consisting of whether (i) there has been a successful
achievement of (ii) the intended results (i.e. the goal or
purpose of the relevant legislation).3 Consequently, the
legislative objective has to be clear, and those parties
who are required to comply (the addressees) need to be
equally clear and, finally, the legislative approach needs
to fit both the legislative objective and the addressees.
In practice, it may be difficult to clearly determine the
objective (parts of) financial legislation aims to achieve.
This is partly because financial legislation often has
complex structures, in the sense that it is layered, divid-
ed into many subsets of legislation, regulations and
bylaws – all of them often having their own specifically
defined individual objectives – and usually has interde-
pendencies with other legislation. The fact that financial
legislation has shown an almost exponential growth
since the financial crisis of 2008 with a general view of
ensuring that such a financial crisis would not occur in
the future has proven to be an important contributing
factor to this development.4 The absence of a clear
objective, or the absence of agreement thereupon, reso-
nates throughout the legislative process and directly
affects the possibility of performing adequate effective-
ness reviews.5 For example, if the intention is to estab-
lish a norm with which full and unabridged compliancy
is required, e.g. deterring destructive or dangerous
behaviour, such legislation would generally benefit from
clearly formulated objectives aimed at either a general or
specific group of addressees.6 Generally, such legislation
will usually engage in an instrumental approach and be
rule-based in its application.7 Alternatively, legislation
Focusing on Effectiveness’, 9(3) European Journal of Risk Regulation
431-44, at 432 (2018).
3. I. Maher, ‘Competition Law and Transnational Private Regulatory
Regimes: Marking the Cartel Boundary’, 38(1) Journal of Law and
Society 119-37, at 126 (2011).
4. S.L. Schwarcz, ‘The ‘Principles’ Paradox’, 1 European Business Organi-
zation Law Review 175-84, at 178-80 (2009); C. Ford, ‘Principles-
based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis’,
55(2) McGill Law Journal 258-307, at 263-5 (2010); J. Black, ‘Forms
and Paradoxes of Principles-based Regulation’, 3(4) Capital Markets
Law Journal 425-57, at 426 (2008); J. Black, ‘The Rise, Fall and Fate of
Principle-based Regulation’, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working
Papers 2010:17, 1-25, at 3.
5. See Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, When Laws Become Too
Complex. A Review into the Causes of Complex Legislation (2013).
6. D. Casey and C. Scott, ‘The Crystallization of Regulatory Norms’, 38(1)
Journal of Law and Society 76-95, at 82 (2011); R.T. Morris, ‘A Typolo-
gy of Norms’, 21(5) American Sociological Review 610-13, at 611
(1956).
7. K.W. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Govern-
ance’, 54(3) International Organization 421-56, at 431 (2000).
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may utilise a more holistic approach, intending to foster
compliance through a principle-based approach through
more generally formulated norms, focussing on the out-
come rather than on strict norm compliancy.8 Some
laws aim to codify norms that are universal in nature
and as such are mere representations of, to a certain
extent, universal perceptions in society on what is
acceptable behaviour, whilst others intend to create new
norms (of expected behaviour),9 the latter often being
the case for financial legislation.10 Consequently, if con-
sensus on the legislative objective is absent or if the
legislative objective proves unclear, the assessment as to
whether such an objective has been achieved and,
connected thereto, the proper addressees have been
identified and if the appropriate legislative approach has
been chosen will be difficult to assess.
In this article, I argue that whether financial legislation
is effective may theoretically be assessed through the
questions: (i) what is the legislative objective? (Section
2), and (ii) who are the intended or expected addressees
(Section 3) and, finally, (iii) what is the legislative
approach and is this expected to be suitable to the out-
come of (i) and (ii) (Section 4)? Following these Sec-
tions, I highlight the complexities connected to the
actual application of these questions in practice, both
through literature research (throughout Sections 2 to 4)
and by applying these questions on a short case study of
product approval regulation in, respectively, the Neth-
erlands, the United Kingdom and as set out by the
European Banking Authority (EBA; Section 5). I subse-
quently set out the considerations of why, despite the
straightforward questions resulting from Sections 2 to 4,
in practice the actual determination of effectiveness of
financial legislation is so difficult (Section 6). I summa-
rise my findings in Section 7.
2 What Is the Legislative
Objective?
Determine the legislative objective and what is the actual
source of the legislative objective? Is this legislative objective
also addressed in other legislation and how, if at all, is either
affected by the other (e.g. which objective is the prevailing
objective)?
The first step in an effectiveness review is to determine
the objective that the legislator aims to achieve through
the specific legislation. The source of the legislative
objective often is not (only) legislation itself but is also
to be found in the legislative history and explanatory
documents that are at the basis of the relevant legisla-
tion. In addition, the complexity of contemporary finan-
cial legislation, whereby general principles are set out in
8. Schwarcz, above n. 4, at 178-80.
9. T.L. Meares, ‘Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement’, 79 Oregon
Law Review 391-415, at 398-9 (2000).
10. J.H. Cochrane, ‘Challenges for Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regu-
lation’, 43(2) The Journal of Legal Studies 563-605, at 577 (2014).
a main body of legislation or framework legislation, sup-
plemented with subsets of legislation or regulation,
results in different objectives depending on which layer
of legislation is reviewed, all of those objectives arguably
in support of the overarching objective of the main body
of legislation. Simultaneously, the question has to be
asked whether the objective may also be addressed
directly or indirectly in existing legislation. In practice,
this may prove to be a challenging question to answer, as
with the still growing body of financial legislation, even
the legislator finds it difficult to maintain full over-
sight.11 Such new or existing legislation may well be
complementary or in fact serve as lex specialis in order to
address specific matters that may not be adequately cov-
ered by existing general legislation and vice versa.12
Alternatively, new legislation may have a detrimental
effect on the existing norms or vice versa. Such impact
may extend to the undermining of existing or new legis-
lation as well as the underlying motivation with the
implementation of new legislation.13 For instance, if
existing legislation applies a rule-based approach and
the new legislation intends (or implies) a more princi-
ple-based approach, the latter could undermine the goal
and purpose of the initial legislation. Such new or exist-
ing legislation does not need to have the exact same
scope for either to exert some level of effect on any other
legislation affected by it. The new or existing legislation
may, for instance, have a (slightly) different scope or a
more limited or alternatively broader scope of addres-
sees, all of which are aspects that could both make a case
for the parallel existence of both sets of legislation as
well as support the argument that such additional legis-
lation should in fact not be necessary but call for amend-
ment of existing legislation.
A complicating factor can be the role of supervisory
authorities in the interpretation of the underlying
legislative objectives, whereby specifically the principle-
based approach may be interpreted in such a way that
would effectively qualify as a rule-based approach. This
concept is known as ‘regulatory creep’, whereby the reg-
ulator tends to fill in expected compliancy by means of,
for instance, guidance in such a way that it is effectively
an implicitly rule-based approach of an otherwise prin-
ciple-based set of legislation.14 This raises the question
whether in such cases the supervisory authority not only
11. Note that the OECD ‘Policy Framework for Effective and Efficient
Financial Regulation’ of 2010 does not (explicitly) include a review of
existing financial legislation to be a requirement for considering addi-
tional steps in financial regulation. See also R.A.J. van Gestel, ‘Wat is
regeldruk? Een verkennende internationale literatuurstudie’, WODC 32
(2006) and Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, above n. 5.
12. L. Poloko, ‘Drafting of Legislation in Compliance with Model Laws’,
15(4) European Journal of Law Reform 415-50, at 421 (2013).
13. J. Newig, ‘Symbolic Environmental Legislation and Societal Self-decep-
tion’, 16(2) Environmental Politics 276-96, at 278 (2007).
14. J. Black, M. Hopper and C. Band, ‘Making a Success of Principles-based
Regulation’, 1(3) Law and Financial Markets Review 191-206, at 197-8
(2007); Black (2010), above n. 4, at 5; J.H. Walsh, ‘Institution-based
Financial Regulation: A Third Paradigm’, 49(2) Harvard International
Law Journal 381-412, at 390 (2008), who notes, quoting the SEC,
“those addressed could choose to ignore its guidance but they do so at
their own peril”.
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takes over interpretation from the legislator but addi-
tionally takes a role as a de facto legislator.15 In financial
legislation, the concept of regulatory creep is arguably
quite prevalent, as evidenced by a multitude of guidance
issued by national supervisory authorities, whereby
supervisory authorities use guidance not only as mere
clarification of legislation but arguably also to push a
supervisory agenda (whether or not under influence of
public opinion and political pressure),16 becoming what
Black refers to as ‘substantive principle-based regula-
tion’.17 A consequence can be that the original legislative
intention, and along with it the wording and potentially
the interpretation of the legislative objective, no longer
fully apply as a matter of fact. This ties in with the prin-
ciple that new legislation needs to not only anticipate
future developments in order to avoid over- or under-
inclusion but also require a reasonable degree of consen-
sus among parties on interpretation for the intended
legislative objective.18 Over time, this consensus may
become increasingly challenged, since regardless of the
legislative approach, legislation in its nature is generally
static, meaning that legislation may not always be able to
either immediately or even at all adequately compensate
or anticipate future variables,19 including those resulting
from changing (social) norms and the corresponding
expectations which, over time, it may prove unable to
meet.20
3 Who Are the Intended
Addressees?
To whom does the legislative objective apply and what is the
scope of addressees (i.e. is a specific group addressed or is the
legislation addressed at a general group of addressees) and
what is the motivation for this choice?
The second step in an effectiveness review is to deter-
mine who should comply with the required norm.21 For
this part, there are effectively two sources. First there is
the simple establishment of who should comply accord-
ing to the relevant legislation in effect. The scoping of
the intended addressees should correspond with the
legislative objective as this may be an important aspect
in whether the legislative objective can actually be ach-
ieved. If the scope is too narrow, addressees that should
be included may be omitted, which may cause legisla-
tion to be only partly effective, i.e. with regard to those
addressees in scope. It would, however, also leave a
number of addressees out of scope, which may cause the
15. D.C. Langevoort, ‘Cultures of Compliance’, 54 American Criminal Law
Review 933-77, at 956-7 (2017).
16. Ibid., at 959.
17. Black (2008), above n. 4, at 435; Black (2010), above n. 4, at 14-18.
18. Cochrane, above n. 10, at 577.
19. Black et al. (2007), above n. 14, at 193-4.
20. J.R. Sutton, Law/Origins, Origins, Interactions, and Change (2001), at
155.
21. Coglianese, above n. 1, at 10.
legislative objective to be only partly achieved. If the
scope is too wide, it may affect the supervisory authori-
ty’s ability to efficiently supervise and/or enforce the
required legislation, potentially creating room for
addressees to be non-compliant without effective detec-
tion, consequently having a potential detrimental effect
on the legislative effectiveness.22
In addition, there is the question of who should be the
intended addressees required to comply with the legisla-
tion according to its legislative history. The legislative
history will generally give (some) insight into the con-
siderations that led to the eventual choices for the
addressees to whom the legislation is addressed. Such
legislative history should show the causality between the
objective that is to be achieved and the addressees that
should reasonably comply with the said norm. In this
context, it can be argued that the selection of the
addressees should be proportionate in relation to the
objective. A too wide scope of addressees may be detri-
mental to the effective application of legislation, e.g. in
the sense that the legislative objective may be addressed
partly at parties to whom the objective is not intended,
potentially causing ineffective application of the super-
visory agenda. Effectiveness may be compromised if leg-
islation affects not only addressees that should be affect-
ed, it also affects those that may not necessarily be obvi-
ous or logical addressees and could potentially not fully
or even at all comply with such legislation. The question
then becomes whether legislation may still be consid-
ered effective if it reaches its goal with respect to those
that it should reasonably apply to but also applies to
those it reasonably should not apply to (regardless of
actual enforcement). Alternatively, a too narrow scope
may cause addressees that should have been taken into
account to remain unaffected, thus limiting the intended
effect of legislation.23 Specifically, in those cases where
effectiveness of legislation depends on enforcement (e.g.
when an instrumentalist approach is leading), the lack of
regulatory resources may detrimentally affect the effec-
tiveness of the underlying legislation. By focussing on a
too small group of addressees, the regulatory interpreta-
tion and enforcement might not be of particular con-
cern; however, it could then be asserted that by not
including and addressing all of the relevant addressees,
the full goal of the underlying legislation would con-
sequently not be met. In either case, it should be noted
that in the long run, the damage may well exceed the
question of legislative effectiveness, as such approaches
can also (eventually) cast doubt whether the perceived
legitimacy of the legislator could be challenged, as over-
inclusion or, alternatively, exclusion of those addressees
22. J. Steffek, ‘The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse
Approach’, 9(2) European Journal of International Relations 249-75, at
254 (2003).
23. Inadequate scoping may have a greater effect than just affecting effec-
tiveness; it may cause legitimacy issues as a result, see e.g. T.R. Tyler,
‘Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation’, 57 Annual
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that should reasonably be excluded or included may cast
doubt on the distributive fairness of such legislation.24
This too may detrimentally affect legislative effective-
ness, albeit not immediately, as a legislator who has its
legitimacy called into question may potentially find it
increasingly difficult to garner support and compliance
with intended legislation.
4 What Is the Legislative
Approach?
Does the legislative approach match the combination of the
legislative objective and its addressees? Is there an expecta-
tion of excessive or, alternatively, too little ambiguity in the
wording and is it reasonably expected to affect the legislative
objective and its addressees?
The third step in an effectiveness review is to determine
which legislative approach has been applied. In financial
legislation, there are generally (a combination of) two
approaches to be found, the rule-based approach and
the principle-based approach. For the regulation of the
conduct side of financial legislation, a principle-based
approach is generally used, whereas prudential law usu-
ally leans more towards a rule-based approach.25 The
appropriate legislative approach provides a foundation
for, and expectation of, the way in which the expected
conduct of the addressees is to take place and thus
which approach is most appropriate, which con-
sequently plays an important part in the actual success –
or effectiveness – of the underlying legislation.26 On the
one hand, the chosen legislative approach can be consid-
ered to be a reflection of the level of trust the legislator
has in the level of compliancy and interpretation to be
expected from the addressees in relation to the
legislative objective, and thus logically the level of
enforcement it should expect to be necessary. If, for
example, the legislator considers that the addressees
cannot be trusted to voluntarily submit to the relevant
legislative requirements, it should generally not want to
use a principle-based approach that would allow a large
measure of freedom of interpretation and implementa-
tion. Rather it would employ a rule-based approach with
a strong basis for the supervisory authority to enforce
the rule that is to be followed.27 Consequently, the
expectation should be that when the legislator chooses a
rule-based approach, as a basic principle, both the
supervisory authority and the addressees need to be able
to rely on unambiguously worded rules as well as on
clearly defined tasks, authorities and penalties.28 The
absence of such clarity in rule-based legislation may
24. J. Sunshine and T.R. Tyler, ‘The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitima-
cy in Shaping Public Support for Policing’, 37(3) Law & Society Review
513-47, at 514 (2003).
25. Ford, above n. 4, at 265.
26. Gestel, above n. 11, at 106-7; Walsh, above n. 14, at 381-4.
27. Walsh, above n. 14, at 381-4.
28. Ford, above n. 4, at 263-4.
have a detrimental effect on the effectiveness of the rele-
vant legislation.29 Principle-based legislation, on the
other hand, generally seeks a more holistic approach
towards the intended objective and how it may be ach-
ieved. As Black notes, principle-based regulation focuss-
es on the aim, or outcome, that is intended to be ach-
ieved, the ‘substantive objective’, rather than on mere
rule compliancy.30 Working with a principle-based
approach implies that you trust the addressee to provide
compliant output;31 as such, it works towards the inten-
tion of the underlying legislation rather than punishing
a rule-breaker.32 Yet, whilst the intention of the legisla-
tor is to be considered the guiding principle, to ensure
uniform compliancy the existence of consensus among
the parties as to the interpretation of the relevant legisla-
tion is a conditio sine qua non; otherwise, a principle-
based approach may result in addressees taking an over-
ly cautious approach for fear of supervisory repri-
mand.33 The addressees should be able to trust the
legislative and supervisory interpretation of the underly-
ing principles to correspond with theirs and vice versa.34
Closely tied to the above is the influence that manner of
drafting of legislation may have on interpretation of leg-
islation,35 whereby the way addressees may have
implemented legislation based on their interpretation of
the underlying legislation may prove contrary to inter-
pretation of the same legislation by the relevant supervi-
sory authority (which may potentially be a cause for reg-
ulatory creep), ultimately causing uncertainty amongst
addressees on both compliance and interpretation as
well as on potential penalties by the supervisory authori-
ties for perceived non-compliance.36 An additional com-
plication regarding drafting of legislation may be found
in the transposition of supranational regulatory require-
ments into national legislation. It is argued that there is
a risk that such requirements may get (partly) lost in
translation or even become subject to alternative inter-
29. S. Kirchner, ‘Effective Law-making in Times of Global Crisis – A Role for
International Organizations’, 2(1) Goettingen Journal of International
Law 267-92, at 275 (2010); Poloko, above n. 12, at 419-21; Sutton,
above n. 20, at 155.
30. Black et al. (2007), above n. 14, at 194; Walsh, above n. 14, at 381-4.
31. Black et al. (2007), above n. 14, at 195; Black (2010), above n. 4, at 3.
32. K. Alexander, ‘Principles v. Rules in Financial Regulation: Re-assessing
the Balance in the Credit Crisis’, 10 European Business Organization
Law Review 169-73, at 196-8 (2009).
33. Ibid., see also Schwarcz, above n. 4, at 178-80.
34. Black et al. (2007), above n. 14, at 196-8; D. Demortain, ‘Enabling
Global Principle-based Regulation: The Case of Risk Analysis in the
Codex Alimentarius’, 6 Regulation & Governance 207-24, at 209
(2012).
35. Kirchner, above n. 29, at 275; Poloko, above n. 12, at 419-21; Sutton,
above n. 20, at 155.
36. Such lack of clarity could also affect the level of legitimacy assigned to
both the supervisory and legislative authority, creating a potential detri-
mental effect that could go further than the then current and underly-
ing legislation, see e.g. Abbott and Snidal, above n. 7, at 433; Black et
al. (2007), above n. 14, at 196-8; J. Jackson, B. Bradford, M. Hough, A.
Myhill, P. Quinton and T.R. Tyler, ‘Why Do People Comply with the
Law? Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions’, 52 British
Journal of Criminology 1051-71, at 1063-4 (2012); Maher, above n. 3,
at 132; Tyler (2006), above n. 23, at 381-3; T.R. Tyler, Psychology and
the Law; The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (2008), at 718.
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pretation.37 In case of the latter, varying social norms
and culture-specific regulatory approaches as well as
socioculturally specific norms on the specific regulatory
field may, to a more or lesser extent, influence the
implementation of supranational legislation into a spe-
cific jurisdiction, leading to a potentially different
approach than was originally intended.38
5 Case Study
The concept of product approval is not new to financial
institutions. It is considered part of good governance to
ensure adequate product approval procedures. Note in
this context the recommendations of the Basel Commit-
tee on the subject of risk and product governance
(BCBS 1998; BCBS 1999; BCBS 2006).39 The focus of
these recommendations was mostly on the risk control
and governance of the financial institution, so as to miti-
gate the financial risk associated with both new and
existing financial products for the financial institutions.
Over time, these recommendations became more
detailed and included inter alia the recommendation to
include scenario analysis prior to product launch; how-
ever, the focus of these recommendations remained
largely aimed at the internal risk governance of the
financial institution (BCBS 2010).40 The consumer-ori-
ented ‘protective’ product approval and review policy
(PARP) governance came later and mostly as a result of
the financial crisis of 2008 as part of a regulatory and
legislative push for containing the (systemic) risks asso-
ciated with the financial services industry (BCBS
2015).41 And whilst many of the principles governance-
wise are similar (such as the need for scenario analysis),
the focus is different, aimed at protecting the consumer
from mis-selling of financial products by financial insti-
tutions. PARP may be considered to be an instrumental
part of governance for financial products and, as such,
one might expect a robust legislative approach towards
PARP, both in embedding legal requirements and how
much financial institutions are allowed to use their own
interpretation as to the implementation of PARP. In
addition, PARP is a perfect example of the way in which
the layered nature of financial legislation in practice is
applied and the extent to which the objectives of the
main financial legislation is reflected in secondary regu-
37. Poloko, above n. 12, at 420.
38. Ibid., see also F. Cafaggi, ‘New Foundations of Transnational Private
Regulation’, 38(1) Journal of Law and Society 20-49, at 26 (2011).
39. Respectively, BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), Frame-
work for Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations (BCBS40)
(1998); BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), Enhancing
Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations (BCBS56) (1999);
BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), Enhancing Corporate
Governance for Banking Organisations (BCBS122) (2006); BCBS (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision), Principles for Enhancing Corporate
Governance (BCBS176) (2010).
40. See also EBA Guidelines on Internal Governance (EBA BS 2011/116,
GL-44).
41. BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), Corporate Govern-
ance Principles for Banks (d328) (2015).
lation. Thus, the choice for PARP to test the questions
under Sections 2 to 4 due to its inherent importance
seems a logical one.
The choice for a review into UK and Netherlands
PARP regulation – respectively, PROD and Bgfo Wft42
– is motivated primarily by the availability of English or
Dutch documentation (and these languages being part
of the skillset of the author), whereas the choice for EBA
(EBA POG Guidelines)43 is motivated by their role in
ensuring a somewhat level playing field in respect to,
e.g. PARP as applicable to banks in the European
Union, i.e. ensuring national supervisory authorities all
work from more or less the same principles on PARP as
well as their role of providing further clarification on
certain (PARP) requirements that follow from EC
Directives (as further clarified below).
1. Determine the legislative objective and what is the
actual source of the legislative objective? Is this
legislative objective also addressed in other legisla-
tion and how – if at all – is either affected by the
other (e.g. which objective is the prevailing objec-
tive)?
The implementation of consumer-oriented PARP regu-
lation in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as
well as the EBA Guidelines on this subject matter can
be traced back to the assertion that the financial crisis
was, at least in part, the result of mis-selling financial
products to consumers.44 The consideration at the basis
of PARP was that the strengthening and assurance of
sufficient governance on the development of new finan-
cial products should function as a safeguard against
large-scale failure of financial products and the conse-
quent mass damages to consumers.45 However, the con-
sideration to avoid mass damages to consumers is not
explicitly reflected in the actual legislation or regulation.
The relevant articles in the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom and set out in the EBA POG Guidelines,
respectively, Articles 32 and 32a Bgfo Wft, sections 1.1
42. Product Intervention and Product Governance Sourcebook (PROD),
release 38 (April 2019), www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/
PROD.pdf (last visited 10 June 2019); Besluit Gedragstoezicht financiële
ondernemingen Wft (Decree on Conduct of Business Supervision of
Financial Undertakings under the Act on financial supervision) (Bgfo
Wft), https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020421/2019-04-01 (last vis-
ited 10 June 2019).
43. EBA Guidelines on Product Oversight and Governance Arrangements
for Retail Banking Products (2016), EBA/GL/2015/18.
44. This position was set out in the Netherlands in the Amendment Decree
Financial Markets (Wijzigingsbesluit financiële markten) 2013, Stb
2012-695, pp. 70-1, implementing the PARP regulation in the Nether-
lands whereas in the United Kingdom this may be derived from the
findings of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (2013),
p. 14, www.bankingstandardsboard.org.uk/banking-standards-
report.pdf. This position may also be found in the guiding explanation
to the EBA POG-Guidelines, p. 7.
45. Whilst this intention does follow directly from section 1.1.1 of PROD,
for the Netherlands you need to review the legislative history of Bgfo
Wft (Parliamentary Documents, House of Representatives (Kamerstukk-
en, Tweede Kamer), 2010-2011, 31980-49) and the EBA POG
Guidelines, p. 16.
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and 3 PROD and sections 4 and 5 of the EBA POG
Guidelines, are focussed on the internal governance of
the financial institutions. Consequently, depending on
the source used, a different objective may emerge.
Looking at the legislative history of PARP, it can be
argued that the objective of PARP is either to avoid
mass damages to consumers due to failure of financial
products or, to this extent, to ensure adequate internal
governance at the financial institution. Alternatively,
when looking solely at the relevant legislation, the objec-
tive may also be interpreted as to ensure the implemen-
tation of the procedural requirements by the financial
institutions that follow from legislation, i.e. to imple-
ment a PARP procedure as prescribed to the previously
noted legislation, regulation or guideline.46 This is prob-
lematic because, depending on which source is used as
the basis on which effectiveness of PARP is to be
assessed, both scope and outcome of the assessment will
likely vary substantially.
Adding further difficulty, in both the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom PARP is considered to be a subset
of rules or guidance intended to support the achieve-
ment of the larger purpose of (framework) financial leg-
islation. Article 32 Bgfo Wft is a further interpretation
of framework legislation, specifically, and respectively,
clauses 4:14 sub 1 and 2 and 4:15 sub 2 of the Dutch Act
on financial supervision (Wet op het financieel toezicht
[Wft]),47 involving in part a duty of care for consumers.
For PROD, however, it may be considered part of gen-
eral governance provisions of the Financial Services
Act; however, unlike the POG Guidelines and Bgfo
Wft, there is not an immediate link to specific legisla-
tion, apart from the link to product intervention
through clause 2.1.1. of PROD2 and clauses 137D and
138M of the Financial Services Act 2012 and the specif-
ic inclusion of MiFID248 product governance provisions
applicable to those financial institutions offering finan-
cial instruments to consumers as set out in clause 3.2.3
of PROD3. Note also that the EBA POG Guidelines are
considered supplemental to specific EC Directives as
well as other EBA Guidelines and as such they explicitly
refer to the EBA Guidelines on Internal Governance,
which addresses not so much the conduct side of PARP
but rather the prudential elements of PARP (e.g. the
impact a new product may have on the balance sheet as
well as on the internal cost and manpower needed to
introduce the product as set out in principle 23 of the
Guideline). Both of the aforementioned Guidelines are
further guidance of the requirement for ensuring ade-
quate internal governance as set out in Article 22 Capital
46. Note in this context that the implementation of PARP is a legal require-
ment in the Netherlands, as follows from Arts. 32 and 32a Bgfo Wft,
whereas in the United Kingdom, for banks at least, PARP is set out as a
guidance (PROD1); yet for investment firms, it is largely set out as a
rule (PROD3), whereby MiFID2 specific rules are supplemented with
(explanatory) guidance by the FCA.
47. Dutch Act on financial supervision (Wft), https://wetten.overheid.nl/
BWBR0020368/2019-02-19.
48. EC Directive on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive
2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (MiFID2), Dir 2014/65/EU
Requirements Directive (CRD)49 and, respectively,
Articles 74 sub 1 CRD IV, 10 sub 4 Payment Services
Directive (PSD) and 7 sub 1 Mortgage Credit Directive
(MCD),50 as a consequence of which it could be argued
that both guidelines are further elaborations of the inter-
pretation of aforementioned articles, but that the main
principle (relating to PARP) is in fact considered to be
covered elsewhere already. As such, PARP may not be
considered to be more than an aid in design, despite
some of the legislative history of PARP suggesting a
more fundamental approach.
2. To whom does the legislative objective apply and
what is the scope of addressees (i.e. is a specific group
addressed or is the legislation addressed at a general
group of addressees) and what is the motivation for
this choice?
Article 32 Bgfo Wft applies to effectively all financial
institutions that operate under a license in the Nether-
lands, initially excluding from investment firms,
although these are now also subject to PARP through
clause 32a Bgfo Wft per the implementation of
MiFID2. Interestingly, the MiFID2 requirements relat-
ing to PARP are largely similar to the existing require-
ments, save for specific requirements such as the dis-
tinction between manufacturer and distributor, but a
separate clause was included nonetheless. In this
respect, it is worth noting that the Dutch supervisory
authorities noted to EBA that they would comply with
the EBA POG Guidelines as per the implementation of
MiFID2,51 yet the aforementioned distinction for man-
ufacturers and distributors now only applies to invest-
ment firms, implying continued non-compliance with
the EBA POG Guidelines. Clause 1.1.1 of PROD1
refers to ‘firms’ as the intended addressees. Firms are
defined in the Glossary of the Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) Handbook as, inter alia, authorised
persons, which includes all those that undertake regulat-
ed activities (as defined in the Prudential Regulation
Authority (PRA) Handbook and for the FCA Handbook
those activities that are defined in Part II of the Regulat-
ed Activities Order, which largely coincide with those
activities specified in the PRA Handbook).52 Given the
different approaches between PROD1 and PROD3,
specifically the exclusive applicability of PROD3 on
MiFID2 investment firms, it may well be argued that
the FCA too does not fully comply with the POG
Guidelines at this time. The EBA POG Guideline itself
ultimately aims to provide guidance to specific financial
49. See EBA BS 2011/116, GL-44, p. 9, point 29 jo. CRD Directive
(2013/36/EU).




52. See the FCA Handbook Glossary on the respective definitions of firm,
authorised person and regulated activitieswww.handbook.fca.org.uk/
handbook/glossary/ (last visited 10 June 2019).
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institutions (i.e. banks holding a banking license); it can-
not do so directly as the Guideline has no direct applica-
bility towards the intended financial institutions. The
Guideline’s primary addressees are the national supervi-
sory authorities, of whom it is expected that they make
every effort to comply with the guideline (but note this
requirement is also directed at the financial institutions).
This presents an interesting conundrum, because only if
the national supervisory authority has the ability to draft
and subsequently enforce binding rules can this
approach imply that the supervisory authorities could be
required to adopt an interpretation that complies with
the POG Guidelines even though national legislation
may (theoretically) not support such an interpretation.
3. Does the legislative approach match the combina-
tion of the legislative objective and its addressees? Is
there an expectation of excessive or alternatively too
little ambiguity in the wording and is it reasonably
expected to affect the legislative objective and its
addressees?
The legislative approach of Article 32 Bgfo Wft is prin-
ciple-based, whereby the legislator provides a set of
minimum requirements and general guidance for the
PARP process without being all too prescriptive
(regardless of whether it concerns a financial institution
or an investment firm).53 It should be noted that the
supervisory authority provides further guidance as to
the implementation of some of what it considers to be
the most relevant parts of PARP, which, as has been
noted before, may well be interpreted more as a rule-
based guidance than the advice it may be purported to
be (i.e. regulatory creep).54 PROD is a combination of
principle-based (PROD1), rule-based (PROD2) and a
combination of both (PROD3), whereby it is interesting
to note that most rules set out in PROD (explicitly
designated by the ‘R’) are accompanied by interpretative
or explanatory guidance (explicitly designated by the
‘G’). Much like Bgfo Wft, PROD is part of layered leg-
islation, meaning it should be read with other legislation
and regulation in hand, both for interpretation and
explanation as well as cross reference. Whilst technically
not legislation as such, the EBA Guidelines do aim to
create some sort of generally applicable interpretation
on POG and PARP in order to ensure a level playing
field amongst the member states so as to avoid all too
great discrepancies in POG and PARP that would detri-
mentally affect the position of consumers of different
member states by requiring national supervisory author-
ities (and indirectly financial institutions as well) to
ensure compliancy with. As such, EBA is fairly pre-
scriptive as to the procedural steps that should be taken,
but not so much when it comes to the actual content of
53. Parliamentary Documents, House of Representatives (Kamerstukken,
Tweede Kamer), 2010-2011, 31980-47, p. 2.
54. See e.g. www.afm.nl/nl-nl/professionals/onderwerpen/product
ontwikkeling.
such procedural steps, as may be derived from pages 16
and further of the POG Guideline. The use of wording
such as ‘should establish’, ‘should ensure’ and ‘should
implement’ indicates that the addressed parties are not
entirely free in the organisation of the POG proce-
dures.55 Whilst the POG Guidelines do not outline
detailed arrangements of the procedural steps required
for PARP, certain minimum requirements are neverthe-
less stipulated. As such, it may be argued that the POG
Guidelines consist of a combination of a more or less
rule-based approach and a principle-based approach.
The rule-based aspects relate to the required procedural
aspects of the Guideline, whereas the actual content of
each such procedural step is fairly open formulated and
consequently would allow for a more principle-based
interpretation. This approach is likely the consequence
of the legislative status of the POG Guidelines, whereby
it is firstly a guideline for the national supervisory
authorities, of whom it may be required to ensure a level
playing field by means of prescribing the procedural
steps of POG that should apply throughout the Europe-
an Union (EU), but leaving the actual content thereof
up to the national supervisory authorities to align with
the nationally chosen legislative approach.
4. Assessment of the PARP case study
The above review shows that the objective of PARP reg-
ulation may be different depending on the source used.
PARP regulation can be seen to govern the implementa-
tion of a PARP process, ensure that mis-selling of finan-
cial products is to be avoided or to prevent (grave) con-
sumer detriment due to mis-selling. Each of these sepa-
rate objectives demands a different approach of assess-
ment, and arguably as the objectives become less specif-
ic or more general in nature, may demand more and dif-
ferent resources than would be the case of a mere assess-
ment whether, for instance, PARP procedures have
been implemented by financial institutions. Adding fur-
ther complexity, PARP can be seen as both a substantive
legal obligation as well as an ancillary to existing obliga-
tions that arise from existing legal frameworks. In case
of the latter, it can be argued that the assessed effective-
ness of PARP holds but limited value due to its nature
of being ancillary to a larger objective, or at least that in
effectiveness review in such a case would need to be
reviewed in conjunction or as part of an effectiveness
review of the larger objective. The difficulties in estab-
lishing which is the objective to be assessed also impact
the questions that follow, i.e. who are the intended
addressees, and is the chosen legislative approach logical
in the context of the previous two questions. If the
objective of PARP is to be seen primarily as a singular
55. ‘Should’ is not the same as ‘must’; ‘should’ is a representation of what is
considered to be the right thing to do but is not exactly compulsory. For
non-native speakers, however, such a distinction may be difficult to
interpret. See also https://keydifferences.com/difference-between-
should-ought-to-and-must.html (last visited 10 June 2019); see also
Xanthaki, above n. 2, at 433.
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substantive legal obligation, the way this is implemented
into legislation as well as in practice simply needs to cor-
respond and be conducive to the said obligation, where-
as if the objective of PARP has to be regarded as ancil-
lary to existing legal obligations, arguably the imple-
mentation of PARP will need to correspond with such
existing legal obligations.
In practice, both Article 32 Bgfo Wft and PROD1 have
a fairly wide scope of intended addressees, applying to
most financial institutions. However, Article 32a Bgfo
Wft and PROD3 list specific PARP requirements for
investment firms only, whilst, interestingly, Articles 32
and 32a Bgfo Wft are substantively similar. Both Arti-
cles 32 and 32a Bgfo Wft apply a principle-based
approach which may be logical if considering PARP to
be ancillary in nature, but, on the other hand, may be
difficult to reconcile with an objective to avoid grave
consumer detriment. PROD3 (applying to investment
firms), on the other hand, is substantially more descrip-
tive, leaning towards rule-based than towards PROD1
(having general application). And whilst this can be
explained as being the result of the implementation of
MiFID2, it is difficult to see how these two approaches
to the same objective could reasonably lead to the same
result. The POG Guidelines as a logical limitation only
require PARP for banks, although within the European
Supervisory Authorities’ framework this requirement is
extended to both investment firms and insurance firms,
although not explicitly to other financial institutions.56
The POG Guidelines are fairly prescriptive in the pro-
cedural steps EBA considers are required for PARP.
However, it has little way of enforcing such steps nor is
it in a position to demand compliance. Essentially, it
could be argued that the limited enforcement powers
EBA has in respect of PARP enforcement are not reflec-
ted in the substantive content of the POG Guidelines.
This simple review highlights some of the more funda-
mental issues with effectiveness review of financial leg-
islation. There may be debate as to the intended objec-
tive, and those objectives are either so broad that they
cannot reasonably be measured or even attributed solely
to this specific legislation or regulation. The lack of
clarity on the underlying objective resonates in the crite-
ria on the addressees and the legislative approach. The
overall conclusion would arguably be that PARP as is
has the potential – and likely does – to have added value
to the overarching principle of avoiding consumer detri-
ment as a result of mis-selling, but that as it stands there
are a number of substantive variables identified even in
this brief review that would likely make the case that the
main objective of PARP is unlikely to be achieved solely
by PARP itself.
56. As set out, e.g. in the ‘Joint Position of the European Supervisory
Authorities on Manufacturers’ Product Oversight & Governance Pro-
cesses’ of the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities
(ESA) (JC-2013-77).
6 The Sense or Nonsense of
Measuring Effectiveness
The issues noted above are illustrative of the difficulties
in assessing the effectiveness of (parts of) increasingly
complex and elaborate financial legislation. The basic
criteria for an effectiveness review as set out above could
theoretically serve as a basis for an effectiveness assess-
ment of legislation. However, as financial legislation
becomes more complex, the fundamental question
becomes whether it is actually practically possible for
such an assessment to take place, and, if so, whether
being able to answer these effectiveness criteria actually
allows the researcher to determine whether the legisla-
tion under review is in fact effective? I argue below that
a review of effectiveness of (parts of) financial legislation
and regulation are not likely to provide any conclusive
answers. This is because the level in which (subsets of)
financial regulation is intertwined with not only other
(subsets of) both financial legislation and other legisla-
tion (such as criminal law and private law); it is in fact
subject to so many different variables that both individ-
ually as well as collectively influence the working and
outcome of financial legislation to such an extent it is in
practice incredibly difficult and requires tremendous
resources for those to be isolated that an adequate effec-
tiveness assessment would, however banal, become
labour-intensive and costly to actually fully execute.57
There are a number of arguments that support the
above approach. To begin with, is the concept of identi-
fying and isolating all relevant variables associated with
the legislation to be reviewed? Such variables are not
limited to whether the intended purpose of legislation is
clear or also covered in legislation elsewhere. Such vari-
ables may concern socio-economical elements, political
motivations and the position of the supervisory authori-
ty,58 to name a few, and the fact that each of the afore-
mentioned are prone to changing interpretation and
perception over time59 or the fact that new or other
related or unrelated legislation may have unexpected
effects on the legislation under review.60 To use an
example, the position and perception of banks in society
57. Coglianese, above n. 1, at 21-3; T.W. Merrill, ‘A Comment on Metzger
and Zaring: The Quicksilver Problem’, 78 Law and Contemporary Prob-
lems 189-204 (2015).
58. R. Pawson, Evidence-based Policy, A Realist Perspective (2006); Xan-
thaki, above n. 2, at 433.
59. Note in this context the observance by E.A. Posner and E.G. Weyl,
‘Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation’, Coase-Sandor Institute
for Law and Economics Working Paper 2014:660, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2346466 (last visited 10 June 2019), at 10-8, addressing the
concept of cost-benefit analysis before legislative implementation, not-
ing that the fact that there is a potential multitude of variables that
could be considered in a cost-benefit analysis and as such on the whole
relevant for the specific legislation, but that this might in fact not have
actual added value for cost-benefit analysis itself, raising the question as
to what would cause a relevant variable to be excluded nonetheless.
See also Cochrane, above n. 10, at 568.
60. J.N. Gordon, ‘The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Reg-
ulation’, Colombia Law School and ECGI, Law Working Paper
2014:233, at 1-19.
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have changed dramatically over the past decade since
the 2008 financial crisis manifested itself; as has the cor-
relating perception of legislative effectiveness. What was
once considered effective has either proven to be regard-
ed ineffective or at least failed to produce the required
result. Often, this has resulted in a (political) push for
yet more legislation,61 including a push to go from a
principle-based approach to a rule-based approach,62
rather than investigating why legislation failed to pro-
vide the intended results (or maybe it did, but these
results no longer were deemed to be the desired
results).63
There is also the question of how to perform an effec-
tiveness review in practice. As a minimum, a baseline
would need to be established prior to implementation of
the relevant legislation as this would provide reference
from which follow-up reviews or measurements can take
place. This would be an interesting proposition as it
would at least provide some point of reference. It can be
argued that in order to establish the said baseline, the
relevant variables that are expected to be of influence on
the outcome, whether they be, e.g. legislative, sociologi-
cal or economical in nature should be charted and would
need to be incorporated in the effectiveness review. The
reasoning is that this should show if any potential
change can be attributed wholly or partly (or at all) to
the new or changed legislation and what if any the influ-
ence of the identified variables is. In addition, upon an
effectiveness review, it needs to be established if new
variables that may also potentially affect the effective-
ness of the legislation under review have been intro-
duced.64 But even if such a review would only be
applied marginally (without charting the relevant varia-
bles), the mere fact that a baseline has been established
would be very valuable if not imperative, as this would
provide at least some basic reference on which a review
can be conducted.65 Alternatively, some argue that an
effectiveness review should be performed in some sort
of controlled environment,66 in which external factors
could be controlled or even excluded. In practice, such a
laboratory-like assessment of legislative effectiveness is
unlikely to be executed or even possible,67 since it would
61. Cochrane, above n. 10, at 575.
62. Alexander, above n. 32, at 169-73.
63. Cochrane, above n. 10, at 567-9.
64. Some of these variables could be qualified as ‘confounders’, which may
be held constant in (certain) statistical models, thus reducing some of
the resources that would otherwise be required for measuring. Note
though that this obviously only works after these variables have in fact
been identified (see Coglianese, above n. 1).
65. The Dutch Ministry of Finance, for instance, recently noted that the
general absence of baseline measurements is one of the important cau-
ses why it is so very difficult, if not impossible, for effectiveness meas-
urements of financial legislation to take place; see in this regard: Parlia-
mentary Documents, House of Representatives, 2017-2018, 31935, nr.
45. Interestingly, the OECD even argues in the OECD “Policy Frame-
work for Effective and Efficient Financial Regulation” of 2010 that a
(full) cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation may not be necessary
or appropriate depending on the impact of such legislation and should
always be ‘proportionate’ to the regulation under review (see, e.g. p.
31).
66. Pawson, above n. 58, at 51.
67. Coglianese, above n. 1, at 38.
imply that subjects are placed in a contained environ-
ment that would allow for the exclusion of external
influences and, arguably, also a set up in which one
group of subjects would be allowed to not be subject to
the specific legislation.68 Aside from the practical chal-
lenges, such as how to determine which external varia-
bles to exclude (e.g. other legislation?), there are ethical
considerations which would likely prohibit any such
experiment. In addition, considering that no external
variables can in fact be controlled in a real-life situation,
it would be virtually impossible to fully attribute meas-
ured outcomes solely to the legislation under review,
and thus such variables should reasonably be identified
as possible influencers beyond control.69
In light of the above, let us review the first question of
effectiveness review set out earlier in this article against
the backdrop of the above, i.e.: what is the legislative
objective? As noted in the example of PARP used, the
mere question of what would be the legislative objective
may in itself prove a difficult question to answer. For
PARP, it may simply be the implementation of a PARP
and its corresponding conditions. However, it may also
be the more holistic objective of avoiding consumer det-
riment. Clearly, the objective of avoiding consumer det-
riment is not one that is limited to PARP; in fact, it may
even be argued that most of the newly implemented
financial legislation since the 2008 financial crisis has
been, to a more or lesser extent, with a view of avoiding
(large-scale) consumer detriment. So what if any influ-
ence may be attributed to PARP? And if, in certain
cases, large-scale consumer detriment is not avoided, to
what extent would that be attributable to PARP? How
does other legislation contribute to the objective of
avoiding consumer detriment and to what extent does
this affect the purported effectiveness of PARP? The
relative nature of these variables becomes even more
apparent when looking at methods of measuring effec-
tiveness of legislation. Take, for instance, the input-
throughput-output model (typically used to assess the
effectiveness of the supervisory authority).70 When
applied to legislation, one of the fundamental problems
with this model, as is noted by Haarhuis and Niemeijer,
is that the outcome not only heavily depends on what
input is but also tends to focus on but one aspect of all
the factors that make up legislative effectiveness, i.e. the
legislative objective and whether this has been ach-
ieved.71 This model may easily allow for manipulation
of the (anticipated) output, specifically by allowing for
limited input (such as merely asking the question: Did
68. It is argued by Coglianese (above n. 1) that such a laboratory-like set-
up may be mimicked by reviewing against a group of subjects placed in
a jurisdiction similar to that of the target subjects but that do not have
the (intended) legislation. Again, this would arguably only work if all
other variables can be identified and contained. In practice, it seems
very unlikely that such a situation would occur.
69. Haarhuis and Niemeijer, above n. 2, at 13.
70. Coglianese, above n. 1, at 8; B.P.A. van Mil, A.E. Dijkzeul and M. Noor-
dink, ‘Beoordeling effectiviteit “Nieuwe Stijl”; Een praktijkperspectief op
het beoordelen van de effectiviteit van een toezichthouder’, 3(2) Tijd-
schrift voor Toezicht 81-90, at 82 (2012).
71. Haarhuis and Niemeijer, above n. 2, at 10-11.
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all relevant institutions implement PARP?), or may seek
focus mostly on objectively verifiable indicators to the
detriment of others indicators.72 The consequent output
may become subject to both discussion and interpreta-
tion as a result, whereby it is noted that output that cor-
responds with existing practice is more likely to be
accepted, further emphasising the risk of input manipu-
lation.73 For a (strictly theoretical) example in this con-
text, if effectiveness research were to show that PARP
regulation has no actual influence over product govern-
ance or may actually even affect product governance
detrimentally, such an outcome, according to Sorenson
et al., would likely yield opposition to such outcome, as
it is not the anticipated, desired or expected outcome
and would undermine existing and accepted practice. It
is also to be noted that those reviewing legislation are
often performing such reviews for and on behalf of the
legislator. As such, use of this model may not give a full
account of the actual effectiveness of legislation due to
lack of a holistic perspective.74 A further complication in
the process of identifying all relevant variables is the
information asymmetry between the legislator and regu-
lator on the one hand and the addressees on the other
hand. Such asymmetries comprise, for instance, infor-
mation deficiencies (the legislator or regulator does not
have all relevant information or does not understand it)
or the legislative process is unevenly balanced by parties
pushing for specific interests to be included in legisla-
tion. To this extent, Goldbach identifies several actors
and motives that may be of influence on the global regu-
latory process, including but not limited to political and
economic motives (both on a micro as well as macro lev-
el).75
When assessing the second question of effectiveness
review set out earlier in this article against the backdrop
of the above, i.e. the consequent selection of addressees,
these may in fact not always be readily agreed upon
including by the relevant addressees themselves. Argua-
bly, this may not directly influence the effectiveness of
legislation; however, as some argue, a lack of perceived
legitimacy may be a cause of but partial or sometimes
even full denial of regulatory obligations.76 This may
introduce a whole new variety of variables that may
undermine any perceived effectiveness to a level that
may not always be readily evident.77 Such effects may be
further aggravated if the legislative approach allows for
interpretative differences and regulatory creep
(although the latter could be considered to be very par-
ticular problem in its own right). Let alone interferences
72. P.L.C. Hilbers, D.R. Rijsbergen, K. Raaijmakers and F. de Vries, ‘Effect-
meting in het toezicht op de financiële sector’, 3(2) Tijdschrift voor
Toezicht 38-49, at 42-7 (2012).
73. C. Sorenson, M.K. Gusmano and A. Oliver, ‘The Politics of Comparative
Effectiveness Research: Lessons from Recent History’, 39(1) Journal of
Health Politics, Policy and Law 139-70, at 162 (2014).
74. Ibid.; Mil et al., above n. 70, at 83.
75. R. Goldbach, ‘Asymmetric Influence in Global Banking Regulation’,
22(6) Review of International Political Economy 1087-1127 (2015).
76. Jackson et al., above n. 36, at 1059; Casey and Scott, above n. 6, at
86-91.
77. Pawson, above n. 58, at 26-34.
that may occur from other legislation and regulation,
changing societal and political norms and acceptance as
well as (macro) economic interferences that are all, to
some extent or the other, of influence over the perform-
ance of a specific piece of legislation. Addressees, on the
other hand, are entities that are (usually) governed by a
multitude of internal and external considerations, mere-
ly one of those being legislative and regulatory compli-
ance.78 Compliance with legislation may not be done
because it is believed to be just or right, but sometimes
merely because it is a must and consequently does not
always lead to the expected results that are sometimes
more holistic in nature (such as avoiding large-scale
consumer detriment) but consist merely of the most lit-
eral interpretations of what are considered to be the reg-
ulatory requirements (the tick-the-box exercises), lead-
ing to maybe formal rule compliancy but not necessarily
to the intended effects and thus lacking the required
effectiveness.79
As for the third question, on the intended addressees,
the legislative approach should be the logical sum of the
legislative objective and the indented addressees and, as
such, legislative effectiveness (if any) will also rely on
the matter of choosing the right approach. This implies
that the need for legislation has already been objectively
determined. In situations where such objective assess-
ment may be less obvious, where legislation may be
used, e.g. for political purposes more so than to achieve
an objectively determined goal, it may well be argued
that the choice of a legislative approach is more or less
irrelevant.80 The multitude of variables surrounding the
legislative approach may consequently cause the
legislative approach to be of limited effect on the out-
come. And as noted in Section 4 above, the legislative
approach can in itself be nullified by those externalities
that would cause a different approach than intended ini-
tially.
I would argue that as a logical consequence of the above
evaluation models that are limited in scope to assess
effectiveness, i.e. those that (allow) focus on but limited
aspects of the effectiveness question, yield results that
are of limited value if any. In order to produce any type
of reliable and valuable data on effectiveness, a holistic
approach in measurement and assessment should be
considered to be a requirement. One such model is the
realist evaluation model, as proposed by Pawson, which
serves as a holistic model intended to encompass the
various variables that influence legislation and as such
would seek to identify the mechanisms that are part of
the core of legislation form the ‘policy’ theory that
underpins legislation and could potentially assess the
impact and influence of some of the identified variables
noted above (the known unknowns).81 This model seeks
78. Cochrane, above n. 10, at 567-8.
79. Ibid., see also Casey and Scott, above n. 6, at 79; Jackson et al., above
n. 36, at 1063-4; Langevoort, above n. 15, at 950; Meares, above n. 9,
at 398; Tyler (2006), above n. 23, at 381-3; Tyler (2008), above n. 36,
at 718.
80. Newig, above n. 13, at 277; Poloko, above n. 12, at 426-7.
81. Pawson, above n. 58.
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to incorporate as much research on the subject matter as
has already been done in addition to identifying as much
of the relevant variables as possible, all after having
identified the appropriate research question.82 Holistic
models such as these, however, require that either
extensive review of the relevant legislation and sur-
rounding variables has been performed or will be per-
formed as well as a basic assumption that at least a base-
line has been established. Absence of this data obviously
directly affects the essence and outcome of such a holis-
tic review and will arguably detrimentally affect the reli-
ability of the data produced. And even though holistic
models such as the realist evaluation model would typi-
cally use much more and a wider variety of data to assess
effectiveness, these too leave unanswered the extent to
which the unidentified variables influence the actual
effectiveness of legislation.83 Finally, a holistic review
requires substantial resources in order to collect data
and perform reviews, whereby arguably these resources
only increase if the legislation under review shows more
interdependencies with other legislation and variables.
In practice, it will likely be the cost of lack of resources
that will determine whether the holistic review is even
an option to consider.
5. Measuring effectiveness in practice: Evaluation of
article 32 Bgfo Wft
On 20 June 2020 an evaluation of Article 32 Bgfo Wft,
ordered by the Dutch Ministry of Finance, was publish-
ed.84 The evaluation, in short, consisted of an assess-
ment of the workings in practice of Article 32 Bgfo Wft
in the market – i.e. did the implementation of Article 32
Bgfo Wft result in changes in processes of institutions
and did the offering of products change – and the extent
to which it could be concluded whether Article 32 Bgfo
Wft could in fact be classified as effective.85 Much in
line with what was noted in Section 5 above, the evalua-
tion noted that to actually be able to assess effectiveness
in fact proved difficult, as the level to which the
legislative objective of Article 32 Bgfo Wft were also
addressed by other (legislative) requirements or
otherwise were not easily isolated and thus specifically
attributable to specific legislation.86 In addition, it was
noted that it could not be established how many institu-
tions, nor to what extent, complied with the regulatory
requirements of Article 32 Bgfo Wft, or had in fact
82. Note that this is but a highly abstracted description of Pawson’s realist
synthesis research model.
83. Cochrane, above n. 10; Gordon, above n. 60.
84. Parliamentary Documents, House of Representatives (Kamerstukken,
Tweede Kamer), 2019-2020, 32545-120, see also B.P.A. van Mil,
P.C.H. van Dijk, B. Knoote, T.B.F. Beverdam and D. Busch, ‘Evaluatie
wettelijke regeling productontwikkelingsproces; artikel 32 Bgfo Wft’,
KWINK groep 2020, at 5.
85. B.P.A. van Mil, P.C.H. van Dijk, B. Knoote, T.B.F. Beverdam and D.
Busch, ‘Evaluatie wettelijke regeling productontwikkelingsproces; artikel
32 Bgfo Wft’, KWINK groep 2020, at 4.
86. Ibid., at 17, 20-21, 24-25 and 34.
implemented it.87 In this context, it was noted that nei-
ther at the implementation of Article 32 Bgfo Wft nor
any time thereafter, was a baseline established. Note
that the baseline in this context was connected to the
level of compliancy of financial institutions, rather than
(holistically) assessing the situation vis-à-vis introducing
(inherently) unsuitable products prior to implementa-
tion. The evaluation asserts that Article 32 Bgfo Wft
may reduce the likelihood of introducing inherently
unsuitable products, but statistical evidence cannot be
produced and – in line with the above-mentioned cav-
eats – the evaluation notes that the purported results
may in fact not be (directly and certainly not solely)
attributable to Article 32 Bgfo Wft.88 In fact, it is noted
that to date financial products are still being introduced,
which may in fact be at odds with the guiding principles
of Article 32 Bgfo Wft.89 The evaluation finally classi-
fies certain aspects of Article 32 Bgfo Wft as effective –
specifically in the assumption that the chances of inher-
ently unsuitable financial products being introduced is
likely reduced – but on the whole the evaluation does
not purport to assume that Article 32 Bgfo Wft can be
qualified as (fully) effective in the sense that the
legislative objective has been, or may be, achieved sim-
ply because the results could not be objectively linked
(solely) to Article 32 Bgfo Wft.90 The evaluation of Arti-
cle 32 Bgfo Wft as such underscores the observations set
out in sections 5.4 and 6 as set out above and serves as
an illustration of the complexities and challenges of
assessing effectiveness in practice.
7 Conclusion
The theoretical principles that govern the effectiveness
of financial legislation and regulation are in themselves
fairly straightforward. The basic questions are (1) what
is the legislative objective and is this by chance already
addressed in other legislation; (2) to whom does the leg-
islation apply and (3) what legislative approach has been
chosen. The combination of answers to these three
questions – stripped of any further variables – are, in
principle, good indicators for the expected effectiveness
of legislation. That is, provided that the answer to (1)
results in an unambiguous answer. Given the many
sources that may be available to determine such an
objective, it may in practice even be difficult to find
consensus on the subject of the relevant legislative
objective. The PARP case study, for instance, shows
that in order to determine the intended objective for
PARP, the legislative history versus the formal texts
may be cause for significant interpretative issues in
determining the actual or intended objective, and con-
sequently may be cause for debate as to what exactly
should be the basis for effectiveness review. This uncer-
87. Ibid., at 13, 19 and 27.
88. Ibid., at 25-27.
89. Ibid., at 27-28.
90. Ibid., at 34-35.
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tainty subsequently affects the consequent questions (2)
and (3), i.e. who are the intended addressees and what
legislative approach is appropriate in connection here-
with, as both are closely intertwined with the first ques-
tion and the results may vary depending on the actual
objective.
Moreover, for effectiveness reviews to be successful, a
holistic approach, such as Pawson’s realist evaluation
model, seems most appropriate in order for an accurate
effectiveness review to take place. However, the amount
of variables to be taken into account in such an approach
is arguably so substantial that not only is it likely to take
up significant resources for them to be determined and
assessed, the extent to which such insight into all of the
most relevant variables and their individual or collective
influence and impact over the legislation under review is
difficult and laborious in most cases and impossible in
some. The explosive growth and increasing complexity
of financial legislation over the past decade may have
additionally attributed to the extent in which such
insight has become increasingly difficult to determine,
even if sufficient resources are in fact available. In addi-
tion, it is noted that the general lack of baseline meas-
urements to compare potential results with present sub-
stantial issues, as absence of a baseline presents the
problem, is there being no basis to compare to.
Does the above then imply that endeavours to assess
legislative effectiveness are pointless or impossible? No,
but a word of caution is advised. Essentially, effective-
ness reviews that are limited in nature are likely limited
in objective value. And the more limited the review is,
the more important it is to determine which objective
was in fact reviewed and which objectives were left out
of scope of the review, so as to avoid representing a
review as a full effectiveness review when in fact it may
only be a partial effectiveness review. The above should
not be read as an argument that effectiveness reviews are
useless or not to perform an effectiveness review. I
would make the case, however, that the outcome of
effectiveness reviews should be placed in the right con-
text, and, as such, depending on the scope of the review
and the sources used, the outcome would need to be
viewed in the context of the generally limited review
that is to date often the case for effectiveness reviews.
And in exactly those cases one should be mindful of the
potential manipulative aspects that may be introduced
into an effectiveness query so as to steer the results a
certain way. As soon as more variables are introduced,
provided these are properly and adequately
incorporated in the review model, the chances of manip-
ulation diminish and more adequate and valuable data
will follow. But the bottom line is, always, if a baseline is
absent, there is little to compare the results to. And as
such the consistent determination and application of a
baseline in effectiveness reviews may very well be con-
sidered one of the most instrumental pieces of data,
which is almost always missing. I would argue that this
will leave most, if not all, effectiveness reviews that lack
a baseline with a limited value, regardless of how many
sources have been used in the review.
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